Abstract: The remarkably long-standing problem of cryptography is to generate completely secure key. It is widely believed that the task cannot be achieved within classical cryptography. However, there is no proof in support of this belief. We present an incredibly simple classical cryptosystem which can generate completely secure key.
In 1983, in a seminal paper, Wiesner first pointed out [8] that quantum mechanics can ensure the security of data. Subsequently, Bennett and Brassard discovered [9] a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol which can generate secure key with the help [10] of classical authentication scheme [11] .
Since then many QKD protocols [12] [13] [14] [15] have been designed. An alternative QKD system, which can itself generate secure key without any support of classical cryptosystem, has also been developed [16, 17] . QKD system has already been implemented over several kilometers [13] [14] [15] and it has been proved to be completely secure [18] [19] [20] in some particular set-up. For public use, quantum cryptographic network is yet to be set up.
If quantum cryptographic network is set up all over the world and if that network is proved to be completely secure, still it would be advantageous to have a classical system which can generate completely secure key since our communication network is entirely classical. Apart from this advantage, it is always advantageous to have two routes to reach the destination. Next we shall present such classical cryptosystem.
System -I
Step 0#. Step 1# a Step 
Illustration :
Step 0# a). Suppose the key K is Step 1 to i # a). Suppose server transmits the following sequences to both A A and B B (none of the sequences is generated by any random number generator). The extraction can be described as
Note that bit positions have been repeatedly used, not the bit values. Needless to say, Shannon's proof [2] does not disallow this indirect reuse of the shared key. Not only a pair/group of parties any number of pair/group of parties can extract their pair of keys from the same sequence, but none of the pair/group will know others' extracted key.
In cryptosystem, where establishing security against eavesdropping is the objective, key can be used for the following purposes: 1. To encrypt a meaningful message or even a key 2. To authenticate a person. 3. To generate a key. But it is still not known whether the same key can be used for all the three purposes.
We shall first consider that the generated key will be used in message encryption. We shall further assume that each extracted key will be separately used to encrypt each message. Each n-bit message M will be encrypted in n-bit key. The encryptions can be written as The entire encryption process may be described as
In cryptography, a n-bit key/message is said to be completely secure if eavesdropper's probability of guessing the key is p g = n 2
1 . Let us prove that the system can deliver completely secure message .
Proof:
The key K is not known to eavesdropper. So, eavesdropper's probability of guessing K r or K p is Next we shall see that the system would crash if the two sets of data R and P are used as "password" or "PIN" for the purpose of authentication.
Eavesdropper is allowed to access the two sets of data R and P after their use. But from a single are perfectly identical with i-th bits of the sequences S 1 , S 2 , … S N . But, due to accidental correlation this can happen with probability N 2 1 . Therefore, the probability of wrongly identifying a bit position is N 2 1 . So, the probability of correctly identifying a bit position is p′ = 1-N 2 1 .
From the above analysis it can be concluded that if the same position key is used N times to extract N keys, and if all the N extracted keys become available to eavesdropper after their use, then eavesdropper's probability of correctly identifying n bit-positions , that is, a position-key, is
Therefore, the system-I is unbreakable if extracted key is used in encryption, but it is quickly breakable, if extracted key is used as data for the purpose of authentication. Even unbreakable system will also crash if stealing of messages is allowed. By stealing N messages eavesdropper can decode N message-encrypting keys and then break the system with the same probability p.
The system-I can generate completely secure message. This is the strength of the system. The extracted keys are not independent keys to the eavesdropper. This is the weakness of the system. The above analysis suggests that a key should not be used more that one time, and A A and B B should use new new independent keys to extract independent keys. Without initially sharing many independent keys it is possible to exchange independent keys through our completely secure channel. That is, weakness of the system-I can be removed by its strength. The modified system is described below.
System-II
Step 1#. Step 2#. S ::
. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Step i#. S ::
The following points may be pointed out. Proof :
• We know,
To extract two sets R and P, the same pair of keys K r and K p are applied on 1 S ,S 2 …..S N . But the extracted sets R and P are not used as secure data. Therefore, U ∈( k 1, k 2 ,…, k N ) will not be available to eavesdropper after their use.
• The set of extracted keys U ∈( k 1, k 2 ,…, k N ) are used in encryption. c 1 = k 1 + X 1 ; c 2 = k 2 + X 2 ;………c i = k i + X i .
We have seen that transmitted keys X 1 . X 2 . …… X i . are completely secure.
• Each exchanged key X i is used one time to extract a pair of keys. The system-II can generate independent uncorrelated keys and the probability of breaking the system is n 2 1 . To break the presented system, eavesdropper has no other option but to steal K. If eavesdropper steals K, he could totally break the system. Suppose eavesdropper fails to steal K. Still he can figure out K with probability less than 1, if he can steal more than one key k i or X i before their destruction.
Let us summarize the discussion. The system-I is unbreakable if the generated key is used only for message encryption. Here users need to share a key, but no random number generator is required. The system-II is unbreakable for all the three types of usage of the generated key -message encryption, authentication and key generation. Users need to share a key, but one of the users should possess a random number generator.
From the security point of view quantum and classical cryptosystem can be comparatively studied. In standard QKD system, two parties need to share a n-bit authentication key, and a random number generator is required to execute it. The probability of breaking completely secure [18] [19] [20] standard QKD system is n 2 1 . To break it, eavesdropper has no other option but to initially steal the n-bit authentication key. We have seen that the same level of security can be achieved by the presented system. Of course both systems can peacefully coexist.
Apart from its use-value both standard and alternative QKD systems have theoretical importance. The strength of quantum cryptography is yet to be fully assessed. Recently, it has been observed [21, 22] that quantum cryptography can provide complete security against cheating. Perhaps, herein lies the unparallel strength of quantum cryptography.
For the presented system, users need an open source of random bits and they should initially secretly share some random bits. However, sometimes open source may remain inaccessible and a common user may find it difficult to share random bits. We have found a prototype [23, 24] of the presented system where, by secretly sharing some decimal numbers, parties can locally generate common key without using any communication channel.
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